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COMMENT ON MERRILL ON
THE LAW OF WASTE
RICHARD A. POSNER
I have been asked to comment on Professor Thomas Merrill’s article
1
about the doctrine of waste in the common law of property, and
2
specifically about his criticism of the approach to that doctrine that I
3
take in my book Economic Analysis of Law. I shall summarize that
approach (with a bit of amplification because the discussion of the
doctrine of waste in my book occupies less than a page) and Merrill’s
criticism, and then offer a brief rejoinder.
I discuss the application of the doctrine only to the competing
interests of life tenants and remaindermen. (The doctrine has a broader
scope, as Merrill’s article shows.) The incentive of a life tenant is to
maximize not the value of the property—that is, the present value of the
entire stream of future earnings obtainable from it—but only the
present value of the earnings stream obtainable during his expected
lifetime. So he will, for example, want to cut timber before it has
attained its mature growth even though the present value of the timber
would be greater if the cutting of some or all of it were postponed; for
the added value from waiting would inure to the remainderman. The
law of waste forbids the tenant to reduce the value of the property as a
whole by considering only his own interest in it.
I pointed out in my book that the doctrine might not be thought
necessary because the life tenant and the remainderman would have an
incentive to negotiate an optimal plan for exploiting the property, either
when the property was first divided between them or when the life
tenant thought he could make some alteration in the property that
would increase the value of his interest without impairing the
remainderman’s interest more. Any alteration that improved the
property in an economic sense would create surplus value for life tenant


Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; Senior Lecturer, University of
Chicago Law School. I thank Steven Weisman for helpful research assistance.
1. Thomas W. Merrill, Melms v. Pabst Brewing Co. and the Doctrine of Waste in American Property Law, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 1055 (2011).
2. See id. at 1087–92.
3. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 3.11 (8th ed. 2011).
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and remainderman to divide; both would be better off if the
improvement were made, provided that they could divide the surplus
value between them. But since tenant and remainderman would have
only each other to contract with, the situation would be one of bilateral
monopoly and transaction costs might be high. Also, the remaindermen
might be children, and children do not have the legal capacity to make
binding contracts; they might even be unborn children. The problem of
bilateral monopoly is less acute in the analogous case of landlord and
tenant, I explained in my book, because the terms of a lease are
established before the parties become locked into a relationship with
each other. But a life tenancy is often created by a will, and the testator
(for whom estate planning may be a once-in-a-lifetime experience) may
not be alert to the potential conflicts between life tenants and
remaindermen.
The law of waste, I further noted, has largely been supplanted by a
more efficient method of administering property: the trust. By placing
property in trust, the grantor can split the beneficial interest as many
ways as he pleases without worrying about the inefficiencies of divided
ownership. The trustee will manage the property as a unit, maximizing
its value and allocating that value among the trust’s beneficiaries in the
proportions desired by the grantor. Of course, the trustee has to be
given the proper incentives to do this. Both carrot and stick are
employed to this end. The trustee is compensated, but he is also placed
under a duty (a “fiduciary” duty, as it is called) to administer the trust as
if it were his own property and he had the same preferences, including
attitude toward risk, as the beneficiaries of the trust are known or can be
assumed to have.
I did not discuss in my book the fork in the road that Merrill
emphasizes: the choice whether to forbid, as waste, the life tenant’s
making any material change in the property, or merely to forbid his
making a change that reduces the overall value of the property. But the
discussion of waste in my book implicitly favors the latter criterion, and
this becomes the focus of Merrill’s criticism of that discussion, as of the
current law, which, he states, strongly supports the economic-value4
maximizing approach, which I support.
Merrill discusses and rejects a third approach. That is to ask
whether the tenant’s proposed alteration of the property would comport
4. Yet oddly, in his recent casebook on property law, Merrill describes the economicvalue approach as the minority view in American common law. THOMAS W. MERRILL &
HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 604 (2007).
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with the intentions of the grantor of the divided interests in the
property. As with many issues of intentionality in law, determining the
grantor’s intentions with respect to the rights of the respective interest
holders is likely to prove indeterminate in practice, so I agree with
Merrill’s rejection of the intentions approach to determining waste, but
we’ll see that Merrill brings intentions in by the back door.
Merrill doesn’t like the value approach either (I should have
expected him at least to like it more than the intentions approach). He
calls it “expensive. Experts will have to testify about different uses of
5
property and different market values for different uses.” He adds:
[T]here will often be uncertainties about the proper unit
of time or the proper physical unit for applying the
economic-value test. For example, persons often acquire
property intending to hold it for future expansion or
development. This may entail holding it in a suboptimal
use for a significant time until the development can take
place. Likewise, persons may hold multiple parcels of
property, which fit together in a general scheme or plan,
even though individual parcels are deployed in ways that
6
are suboptimal from a market perspective.
These could be problems in particular cases, but Merrill doesn’t
discuss any cases in which they actually have been problems. In fact, he
discusses only two cases, one the nineteenth-century case in the title of
his article, another a case in New York from the 1920s. In both, it seems
plain (in fact, it doesn’t seem to have been disputed) that the tenant’s
proposed action—in both cases the demolition of an antiquated mansion
in a modernizing city—would increase the value of the property.
Maybe the reason for the absence, as it seems, of cases in which the
fears he expresses have materialized is that there are no such cases; or
maybe it is simply “[t]he extreme infrequency of modern cases applying
7
the doctrine of waste.” That infrequency would normally be thought a
good thing; it suggests that the law is sufficiently clear, in application as
well as in concept, to enable the vast majority of cases to be settled,
probably, indeed, in advance of being filed. Nor does this appear to be
an area in which asymmetry of discovery costs often forces settlement of
cases that have no merit, as in class action litigation, or in which an
5. Merrill, supra note 1, at 1088.
6. Id. at 1089.
7. Id. at 1090.
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asymmetry of stakes or resources in favor of potential defendants
discourages the filing of meritorious lawsuits, as in some areas of
consumer law. But Merrill argues that the reason for the dearth of cases
is that persons sharing interests in property bargain to the optimal
solution to their joint-maximization problem, and from this he infers
that the “material alteration” criterion for waste is superior to the
“value” criterion because it encourages a bargained-for resolution of the
parties’ conflicting interests.
This is a complicated argument. Actually I don’t understand it. So
here is how I would recast it. The trust, as I suggested earlier, is a more
efficient way of dealing with the problem of conflicting interests in the
same piece of property than the law of waste. It establishes a neutral
third party—the trustee—to arbitrate the parties’ competing claims.
This avoids litigation except in the rare case where the trustee’s
resolution of the dispute can be challenged in court with a fair chance of
success despite the broad discretion that trust law vests in trustees. The
rise of the trust—a rise that is a broad-based phenomenon that has little
if anything to do with the choice between material alteration and
economic value as criteria of waste—may largely explain the decline in
litigated waste cases. Merrill presents no evidence that the use of the
trust in situations that would otherwise be governed by the law of waste
is attributable to the adoption by most states of the value criterion,
when once the material-alteration criterion reigned. Merrill himself
suggests that nonjudicial solutions to traditional “waste” situations are
attributable to declining costs of contracting.
Merrill is right that, other things being equal (an important
qualification, but one I can ignore), a clear rule will reduce disputants’
recourse to adjudication, and that is usually a good thing, though he
does not discuss the complication introduced by my reference to
bilateral monopoly. But if the courts have substituted, as he believes, a
vague standard (economic value)—vague in application, he believes, not
conceptually vague—for a clear rule (material alteration), why isn’t that
reflected in litigation? Maybe the answer is that its vagueness drove
parties to adopt contractual alternatives ex ante, such as the trust, so
that if and when a tenant decided to alter the property there would be
no occasion for litigation. Merrill does say that the infrequency of
modern cases “strongly suggests that contractual solutions are the norm,
8
not litigation,” but unless I have missed something he does not attribute
this norm to the vagueness of the economic-value concept.
8. Id.
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This may seem to make the choice of the standard for determining
waste academic. In effect, holders of property interests have opted out
of the law of waste. No cases—so no legal niceties to trouble the mind.
But this is an overstatement. Cases of waste may be infrequent, but
9
they do occur, as of course Merrill knows. He says: “The law of waste
functions as a default rule or baseline for contracting, not as a decisional
10
rule applied by courts—at least not very often.” He thinks that there
would be even fewer cases (and that this would be all to the good) if
courts would revert to the material-alteration criterion, because, he says,
it is clearer than the economic-value criterion. But is it? He says that to
apply the material-alteration criterion “[o]ne need only examine the
property itself or—in the event the property has been modified—consult
architectural drawings, photographs, or evidence about its condition
11
when title was divided.” The property must have been altered, or there
would be no dispute. The question is whether the alteration was
“material.” Materiality is relative to some goal, interest, or value, and
Merrill is unclear about what that goal, interest, or value is. He refers
12
repeatedly to protecting the “subjective expectations” of the parties.
Does he consider “subjective expectations” litigable? And what if the
parties’ subjective expectations differ? In that case he says that it’s
normally the owner’s subjective expectations that should govern. But
he acknowledges that that doesn’t work if the grantor is different from
the remainderman or the lease has a very long term, such as ninety-nine
years, which is de facto ownership.
He does suggest, a little more concretely, that a tenant who “changes
the condition” of the property has committed waste, and that the
13
condition of the property is a “physical fact.” But not every change in
the condition of property could plausibly be thought a material
alteration. Is it waste to install central air conditioning? To convert a
barn to a garage? To pave a driveway? Are all improvements that alter
a property physically waste? Merrill retreats to “normal owner

9. A Lexis search reveals 255 waste cases in the last ten years. Merrill says that a different source yields an estimate that the number of reported decisions adjudicating waste claims
has, in recent decades, dwindled to an average of barely one per year. Merrill, supra note 1,
at 1084–85 n.140. John Lovett, Doctrines of Waste in a Landscape of Waste, 72 MO. L. REV.
1209 (2007), however, argues forcefully for the continued practical importance of the doctrine
of waste.
10. Merrill, supra note 1, at 1087.
11. Id. at 1090.
12. Id. at 1055, 1059, 1093, 1094.
13. Id. at 1091.
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behavior,” or “contemporary community standards,” as keys to
14
determining materiality.
Merrill gives a version of the timber example that I use in my book;
he says that “[i]f an agricultural tenant would normally cut some trees to
repair fences and for firewood, then this would not be a material
alteration. If an agricultural tenant would not normally cut trees for
15
commercial sale, then it would be a material alteration.” That’s fine,
but Merrill should be pressed to explain why an agricultural tenant
would not “normally” cut trees for commercial sale. Is this to be
thought just some quaint rural custom, to be inferred from testimony by
the locals? Isn’t the real point that if the tenant is allowed to go into the
lumber business he will reduce the overall value of the property by
cutting down the trees prematurely? And isn’t this point clear without
testimony from the locals, or for that matter from the expert witnesses
whose expensiveness bothers Merrill? I imagine that in practice the
criterion of material alteration has always been implicitly economic and
that all the courts have done is made its economic character transparent.
Merrill concludes with a short Richard Epstein-like paean to
property “as an individual right” that “confer[s] sovereign-like powers
16
on those we regard as owners.” He regards this “my home is my
castle” concept of property rights as strongly buttressing his argument
that the material-alteration criterion would minimize litigation. But
from an economic standpoint, which is the standpoint (obviously) of
Economic Analysis of Law, property rights are instrumental to
achieving economic efficiency, rather than being ultimate social
desiderata. Merrill has not shown that from the standpoint of overall
efficiency (minimizing all costs) the material-alteration criterion is
superior to the economic-value criterion for determining whether a life
tenant or other holder of a property interest has unilaterally altered the
property in a way that constitutes what the law forbids in the name of
waste.
I am guessing that Merrill’s philosophical conception of property
rights is the real motivation of his article, and not a desire to minimize
waste litigation. The reason is that by his account there is almost no
such litigation any more. If there is on average one reported waste
17
decision a year, there cannot be very many waste cases filed, so trusts
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id. at 1092 & n.161.
Id. at 1092.
Id. at 1093–94.
See supra note 9.

POSNER L. REV. COMMENT 13AUG11.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

COMMENT ON MERRILL ON WASTE

8/13/2011 10:49 PM

1101

and contracts must indeed have displaced waste as the legal regime for
regulating divided property interests. If as he believes this displacement
is a good thing, why change the doctrine? Could a change in doctrine
really be expected to reduce litigation to zero? Of course not: any new
doctrine will promote litigation, at least initially, as judges and litigants
expound and refine and interpret and apply the doctrine.

